Evidence Survey by Jennings, Richard C.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 72 
Issue 3 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 13 
January 2021 
Evidence Survey 
Richard C. Jennings 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Richard C. Jennings, Evidence Survey, 72 Denv. U. L. Rev. 703 (1995). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
EVIDENCE SURVEY
INTRODUCrION
This article addresses three Survey year' decisions in which the Tenth
Circuit affirmed lower court rulings regarding evidentiary admissions. These
resolutions continue recent trends in which the Tenth Circuit has broadly inter-
preted federal statutes and evidence rules. These trends favor an inclusive
approach to evidence admission which may aid a court or jury by providing
additional testimony for their consideration. This policy, however, may unfair-
ly prejudice the person who opposes the evidentiary admission. The circuit's
approach often furthers the legislative goals and Supreme Court interpretations
of federal statutes and evidence rules.
In the first case addressed, United States v. Overstreet,2 the issue was
whether federal prosecutors presented sufficient evidence to prove that a con-
victed felon3 possessed a firearm that had "travelled in interstate commerce."4
The court's decision makes it easier for federal courts to impose gun posses-
sion convictions. The second case, LWT, Inc. v. Childers,5 determined that a
person's pleadings from a prior state court action are admissible against that
person in a subsequent federal court action.6 This decision may frustrate the
liberal pleading and joinder policies prescribed by the federal rules of evi-
dence. Video animation prepared by an expert witness was admitted in the
third case, Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad.7 The Tenth Circuit based
its decision to admit the video on a recent Supreme Court case which expand-
ed the role of expert witnesses by admitting relatively new scientific opin-
ions.8
The resolution of these cases indicates that the Tenth Circuit will allow
district courts to push the boundaries of balance required by federal rules of
evidence.9 This policy permits admission of evidence that may be probative
1. The survey year spans from September 1, 1993 to December 31, 1994.
2. 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
3. The defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1)-(2) which states:
It shall be unlawful for any person who, (1) has been convicted of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or (2) who is a fugitive from justice, to
ship or transport any firearm or ammunition in interstate commerce, or receive any fire-
arm or ammunition transported in interstate commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)-(2) (1988).
4. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1095. Proof that the firearm was transported in interstate com-
merce is an essential element of the statute under which the defendant was charged. Id. at 1095
n.4. See supra note 3. Article I of the Constitution authorizes Congress to impose restrictions
related to items shipped via interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
5. 19 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 542.
7. 16 F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994).
8. See id. at 1088 (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
2786 (1993)).
9. FED. R. Evil. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presenta-
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but is, at least arguably, prejudicial. In each of the three cases, the proponent
of the disputed evidence ultimately prevailed in the underlying trial.
In addition to detailing the Tenth Circuit's trend toward admission of
disputed evidence, this Survey examines the resolution of similar disputes in
other circuits and indicates that other circuits may exclude evidence similar to
that admitted in these cases. This Survey also reviews a significant difference
between the Tenth Circuit and a state court within its geographical region.
That difference may result in forum shopping between state and federal courts
within the geographical area of the Tenth Circuit.
I. EVIDENCE OF INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF FIREARMS
A. Background
Possession of a firearm that was transported via interstate commerce may
violate federal law if the firearm possessor is a fugitive from justice or has
been convicted of a felony.'0 People who use firearms while committing
some federal crimes may face penalties in addition to the punishment they
receive for the underlying crime. For example, a person who carries or uses a
gun while committing a violent crime or a drug trafficking offense may face
additional penalties. The enhanced prison sentence will range from five to
thirty years, depending on whether the firearm is a handgun, short-barreled
rifle, or machine gun." A second conviction under the statute may result in
life imprisonment. 2 Under federal law, district courts are powerless to sus-
pend the additional sentence, which runs consecutively with other penalties. 3
Further, a person with three prior felony convictions who is later convicted of
possessing a firearm transported in interstate commerce could receive a
$25,000 fine and additional prison time of at least fifteen years. 4 The court
may not suspend the sentence, and the convicted person will neither receive
probation nor be eligible for parole under this conviction. 5 These enhanced
penalties are "designed to designate additional punishment for armed, repeat-
ing, criminals."' 6
The use of guns during the commission of violent or drug trafficking
crimes probably led to many of these penalty enhancement statutes. Neither
tion of cumulative evidence."
10. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l)-(2). The text of those subsections is provided supra note 3.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of vio-
lence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for
five years ... " or thirty years if the firearm is a machine gun. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
12. Id. A second or subsequent conviction results in a sentence of twenty years im-
prisonment, and if the firearm is a machine gun, or equipped with a firearm silencer or muffler, or
is a destructive device, life imprisonment without release. Id.
13. Id. No person sentenced under this subsection shall be eligible for parole during the term
of imprisonment. Id.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
15. Id.




the application of these statutes nor the act of proving firearm possession or
use has been as easy as might be expected. One of the earliest cases involving
a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l), 7 a firearm use or possession statute,
was United States v. Jssacs.'5 The prosecution sought to introduce firearms as
evidence of drug trafficking and the defendant objected on grounds of double
jeopardy. 9 At a prior trial, the defendant had been acquitted of using a gun
while possessing drugs with the intent to distribute.20 The Ninth Circuit stated
that the "trial judge has discretion to admit evidence of firearms in drug traf-
ficking cases. '"2 ' Also, the dismissal of the gun counts relating to drug pos-
session did not preclude admission of the firearms if that evidence was rele-
vant to prove gun use during drug trafficking.22
Proving possession or use of firearms is often difficult when there are
multiple parties to the crime. In a Seventh Circuit case, United States v.
Missick, a the court was asked to decide whether a person who supplied drugs
could be given an enhanced sentence for possessing or using a gun during an
illegal drug sale when only the purchasers had a gun with them during the
transaction. The purchasers were charged with using the gun during the drug
trafficking crime.24 The court stated that the seller might have similarly been
charged based on the purchasers' gun possession under a co-conspirator theory
of liability. 5 However, the defendant's enhanced penalty for firearm use was
dismissed because the prosecution failed to show that the defendant was in-
volved in a conspiracy with the purchasers. 6
A recent Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Medina,2 affirmed an en-
hanced penalty for gun use in a conspiracy.28 Evidence showed that the de-
fendant housed guns in his apartment during the course of the conspiracy.29
The court attributed gun possession to the defendant since the prosecution
demonstrated that a member of the conspiracy possessed a gun and the posses-
sion was reasonably foreseeable to other members of the conspiracy."0
The Tenth Circuit employs an interesting approach to prove that firearms
17. The text of the section is provided supra note 11.
18. 708 F.2d 1365, 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 852 (1983).
19. Id. at 1371.
20. Id. A judge had granted Issacs' motion for acquittal on two counts of using a gun to
commit the drug possession crimes. That first trial ended in a mistrial. Id. at 1366. The Circuit
found no merit in Issacs' double jeopardy argument. Id. at 1371.
21. Id. at 1371.
22. Id.
23. 875 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1989).
24. Id. at 1301. They were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). Id.
25. Id. See also Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946) (stating the require-
ments necessary to show conspiracies and resulting liabilities).
26. Missick, 875 F.2d at 1302. The defendant had not been charged as a conspirator. The
underlying conviction of drug trafficking was affirmed. The case was remanded for resentencing
because the trial judge erred in enhancing the penalty for firearm use or possession. Id.
27. 992 F.2d 573 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1049 (1994).
28. Id. at 592.
29. Id.
30. ld. Extensive evidence was presented at trial regarding the intricacy and interrelationship
of the conspiracy and its members. The Circuit did not elaborate on why gun use was foreseeable.
Id.
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were transported via interstate commerce. The approach makes it relatively
easy to obtain gun possession convictions and seems biased in favor of the
prosecution. Essentially, it allows federal district courts to rely on evidence of
an absence of gun manufacturers in the state where the defendant is charged to
prove a gun found in that state must have travelled via interstate commerce.
In United States v. Gregg,3' the defendant was charged with possessing a
firearm previously shipped in interstate commerce and for robbing an Oklaho-
ma bank.32 Two hand guns were found in Gregg's car when he was ar-
rested.3 3 Finding the guns, however, was not a prerequisite for a firearm pos-
session conviction.34 Proof of firearm possession was shown by detailed testi-
mony at trial given by the bank's employees and customers.35
Evidence that the gun was transported interstate was shown by testimony
of a firearms expert that there were no major gun manufacturers in Oklahoma,
and that Ruger single action weapons are manufactured only in Connecticut.
36
The Tenth Circuit therefore concluded that the gun used by Gregg was trans-
ported interstate. This evidence, and the fact that Gregg had a prior felony
conviction, was sufficient to affirm the firearm possession charge. 8
In another Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Hamilton,39 a gun posses-
sion charge under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)' was affirmed.4 The defendant
confessed to using a gun obtained in West Virginia during a service station
robbery in Oklahoma. The gun was never found.42 The defendant, represent-
ing himself at trial, stated that he carried a carved wooden replica of a gun
during the robbery. Although this contradicted his earlier confession, he ar-
gued he could not be convicted of a firearm possession charge.43
On appeal, Hamilton argued for reversal because the prosecution failed to
produce the gun at trial and the indictment stated he used a gun, not a wooden
31. 803 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920 (1987).
32. Id. at 569.
33. Id. at 571 n.2. "One of the hand guns was a Ruger Security Six .357 Magnum revolver
with dark finish and handle, and the other was a Sterling .380 automatic, with a silver type fin-
ish." Id.
34. Id. at 571. The Circuit stated "[tihe government was not required to produce an actual
firearm at trial, or prove the specific manufacturer or serial number of the firearm in question." Id.
35. Id. The bank president described the gun as "kind of a blue steel revolver." Another
employee described the gun as "about so long ... like a cowboy gun that you see in the mov-
ies ... it had white handles." Other witnesses described the gun as looking like a Ruger and a
single action revolver. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. "Proof that a firearm is manufactured outside the state in which the possession oc-
curred is sufficient to support a finding that the possession was in or affected commerce." Id. See
also United States v. Johnson, 722 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The trial court in that
case admitted a serial number report provided by the gun manufacturer to show that the gun re-
covered at the crime scene was manufactured out of state. Id. at 409.
38. Gregg, 803 F.2d at 571. Gregg had three prior felony convictions. Id. at 569.
39. 992 F.2d 1126 (10th Cir. 1993).
40. See supra note 3.
41. Hamilton, 992 F.2d at 1130.
42. Id. at 1128. Hamilton stated, shortly after his arrest, that he used a .38 revolver, obtained
in a Benwood, West Virginia burglary, in the Oklahoma service station robbery. Id.
43. Id. at 1129. Hamilton maintained that a wooden replica of a gun was not a "firearm."
The jury found him guilty. Id.
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replica."M The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument by stating that convictions
will not be set aside for simple variances between the facts presented at trial
and the indictment as long as the crime at issue is proved.45 The court relied
on the service station employee's testimony to prove firearm use.' Both par-
ties had stipulated that there were no gun manufacturers in Oklahoma,"' so
the court concluded that the gun was transported interstate.4 Based on this
evidence, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the firearm possession charge.49
Together, these cases indicate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to affirm
firearm possession convictions if the guns are recovered. The court may also
affirm convictions in situations where the gun is not recovered but is accurate-
ly described. Even in the absence of confessions regarding firearm transport,
the Tenth Circuit may still uphold convictions. Such convictions are made
possible by testimony that the specific type of firearm described is manufac-
tured outside the state where it was used by the defendant. As such, the issue
in United States v. Overstreet," was whether a defendant may be convicted if
a gun is either not recovered or accurately described. Also at issue was the
admissibility of speculative testimony regarding interstate transport despite the
lack of an accurate description of the gun.5'
B. United States v. Overstreet
1. Facts
In Overstreet," the defendant was charged with armed carjacking," us-
ing a firearm while committing a violent crime,4 and possessing a firearm as
a convicted felon." Early in 1993, the defendant and the victim, Miles Hold-
en, agreed to swap the defendant's Jeep Cherokee for Holden's Chevrolet
Camaro.56 When the defendant determined that the Camaro was not perform-
ing to his expectations, he decided to retrieve the Cherokee from Holden. He
accomplished this retrieval late one evening, approximately one month after
the initial swap, by holding a gun to Holden's face. 7 The defendant was ar-
44. See id. Hamilton claimed there was insufficient evidence to convict him on the firearms
violation because there was insufficient evidence to show that he, as alleged in the indictment,
used a .38 caliber gun in the robbery. Id.
45. Id. at 1130. The Circuit also concluded that Hamilton was not prejudiced in his defense
by the variance. Id.
46. Id. at 1128. She described the gun as "either dark gray or black with a checkerboard
design cut into a brown handle." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1130.
49. Id. The store clerk's testimony also played a key role for the jury. She stated she knew
the gun was real because it sounded heavy and made of metal when Hamilton laid it on the coun-
ter. Id.
50. 40 F.3d 1090 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1970 (1995).
51. Id. at 1095.
52. Id. at 1092.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
56. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1092. The parties met through a mutual friend. The case does not
indicate whether actual titles to the vehicles were ever exchanged. Id.
57. Id. The Camaro had mechanical problems and the defendant had to spend money having
1995]
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rested later that evening and was initially charged with carjacking and using a
firearm. 8 The first trial resulted in a hung jury.59 The government then filed
a superseding indictment adding the gun possession charge.' The gun in
question was never recovered and was not available at trial.6 Holden testified
that the defendant approached him early in the morning of the carjacking and
pointed a silver revolver at him. Holden also stated that "he could see bullets
in the chamber and that he recognized defendant's face and voice." 2 The
jury in the second trial convicted the defendant on all three counts.63
The Tenth Circuit exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to
review the district court decision." The defendant raised three objections on
appeal: 1) the constitutionality of the carjacking statute; 2) the issues of double
jeopardy; and 3) the admission of evidence regarding the interstate movement
of the firearm.6' The Circuit affirmed the convictions on all three counts.'
Overstreet's primary objection on appeal regarding the firearm transport
charge was the trial court's admission of testimony given by Richard Turn-
er.67 Mr. Turner had not examined any particular firearm in connection with
the case and had no knowledge or opinion about the firearm mentioned in the
indictment. He testified that there were not, and had never been, any revolver
manufacturers in Oklahoma."
Overstreet argued that the gun was not sufficiently identified to provide
foundation for Agent Turner's testimony.69 Overstreet based this argument on
United States v. Gregg,0 which admitted similar testimony only after a de-
tailed description of the gun was provided by witnesses to the crime.7 The
Tenth Circuit recognized that the gun in the instant case was described in
much less detail than in Gregg.72 In this case, however, Holden's testimony
that a revolver was used, and that it looked like the large, silver gun used in a
courtroom demonstration, was sufficient foundation for Mr. Turner's testimo-
it repaired. On the evening of the carjacking, Holden drove to an apartment complex to pick up
the parties' mutual friend. When Holden returned to the vehicle, the defendant was waiting for
him, apparently to take back the vehicle. Id.




61. Id. at 1095.
62. Id. at 1092.
63. Id. The defendant was sentenced to 77 months for carjacking and gun possession and a
consecutive term of 60 months for gun use. Id.
64. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals ... shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States .... 28 U.S.C. § 1291
(1988).
65. Overstreet, 40 F.3d at 1092.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1095. Mr. Turner is a federal Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 803 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 920 (1987).
71. See id. at 571. The testimony regarding Gregg's gun, which was recovered and available
at trial, is provided supra note 35.




ny.73 The court concluded that since no revolvers were manufactured in Okla-
homa, any gun used in Oklahoma during a carjacking must have travelled via
interstate commerce.74
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision reveals a decline in the requisite foundation
for speculative testimony regarding interstate firearm transport. In both Gregg
and Hamilton, the guns were accurately described. An accurate gun description
was not a prerequisite in Overstreet. This increasingly liberalized policy of
evidence admission is also seen by comparing Gregg, in which guns were
recovered, accurately described, and available at trial, to Hamilton, in which
the defendant confessed to using a gun transported interstate, and Overstreet,
in which there was no recovery or accurate gun description. Based on this
transition, unless a convicted felon lives within a state in the Tenth Circuit
region in which firearms are manufactured, he or she may receive enhanced
penalties for gun possession regardless of whether the firearm is recovered or
even accurately described.
Admittedly, if there are no gun manufacturers in the Tenth Circuit region,
it seems disingenuous to argue against speculation that any gun found in the
region must have travelled interstate. This trend is disturbing, however, be-
cause the Tenth Circuit is, arguably, eroding the defendant's constitutional
protection." Limiting gun use in the commission of violent crimes is a desir-
able goal. However, the Tenth Circuit may exceed constitutional bounds when
imposing gun possession penalties.
Completely absent from discussion in these cases was a determination of
when the defendant obtained the gun. It is possible the guns at issue in Gregg
and Overstreet were obtained prior to the statute's enactment.76 Following
these cases, the Tenth Circuit may require convicted felons to dispose of any
firearm, which travelled interstate, even if they obtained the firearm prior to
the statute's enactment.77
The Tenth Circuit's transition from Gregg to Overstreet, is likely frustrat-
ing to felons because of the lowered requisite foundation for testimony regard-
ing transport of unrecovered firearms. This transition will make it much easier
in the Tenth Circuit for federal district courts to penalize convicted felons who
73. Id. at 1095. A real gun was used in a courtroom demonstration of the carjacking. Id.
74. Id.
75. The Tenth Circuit's policy may infringe on the Second Amendment (the right to bear
arms) and the Fifth Amendment (protection against taking of private property). See U.S. CONST.
amend. II & V.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was enacted on June 19, 1968. That statute makes it unlawful for
a convicted felon to transport a gun in interstate commerce. There is no mention in the statute of
whether it is unlawful for a convicted felon to possess a gun that travelled interstate prior to the
statute enactment.
77. This retroactive approach is counter to a recent Supreme Court decision. In Landgraf v.
USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1508 (1994), the Court stated that there is a strong presump-
tion against retroactivity. The Court also concluded that justification sufficient to validate the
statute's prospective application under the Due Process Clause may not adequately justify a retro-
active application. Id. at 1497.
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possess firearms. However, the Tenth Circuit's policy regarding sufficiency of
gun possession evidence furthers the legislative goal of penalizing armed
and/or repeat offenders.
II. ADMISSION OF PRIOR INCONSISTENT PLEADINGS
A. Background
Prior inconsistent statements made under oath by witnesses are not hear-
say78 and are admissible at trial.79 Accordingly, these statements may be in-
troduced to impeach a person's testimony at trial or to prove the truth asserted
by the prior statement.
Numerous factual situations may subject a person to multiple lawsuits in
one or more jurisdictions. 0 The question of whether a person's inconsistent
pleadings from an earlier litigation are admissible against that party in subse-
quent litigation has not received an unanimous answer in the circuit courts that
have addressed the issue."' The Eighth Circuit has indicated that one reason
to deny admission of prior inconsistent pleadings 2 is to prevent the frustra-
tion of the liberal pleading and joinder rules, which encourage parties to plead
alternative theories of liability.83 Thus, to admit prior inconsistent pleadings
would cause prejudicial error.8 4
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can be construed to deny admis-
sion.85 Rule 36 allows a party to focus on a particular case and broadly state
theories of recovery in its pleadings. Open discovery rules can fill in the gaps
with facts or discard the theories after discovery is complete. 6 Modem trea-
tises state that any restriction on the liberality of pleading rules should be dis-
78. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
79. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)-(2). Hearsay does not include admissions made by a party when
the statement is offered against that party. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). Regardless of the fact that a
prior statement is not hearsay, it is only admissible if, under the balancing test of FED. R. EvID.
403, supra note 9, the statement is more probative than prejudicial.
80. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 19 F.3d 514, 516 (10th Cir. 1994)
(involving wrongful death actions in a state court and a declaratory judgment suit brought by the
insurance company in federal court).
81. See Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co., 874 F.2d 36, 39-40 (lst Cir. 1989) (noting different
circuit opinions on the admission of inconsistent pleadings).
82. Prior consistent pleadings may be denied admission because of needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. FED. R. EVID. 403.
83. Garman v. Griffin, 666 F.2d 1156, 1159-60 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to admit amended
inconsistent pleadings).
84. Id. at 1160. The court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2) which allows for alternative
claims in pleadings. Id. at 1160 n.6.
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 36(b) states: "[any admission made by a party under this rule is for the
purpose of the pending action only and is not an admission for any other purpose nor may it be
used against the party in any other proceeding."
86. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26. These rules require opponents to disclose to the other party all
non-privileged facts and expert theories that will be presented at trial. See also Oiler v.
Kincheloe's, Inc., 681 P.2d 630, 636 (Kan. 1984) (discussing the evolving concepts of pleading).
The court noted that "technical pleading has vanished." Only a bare-bones pleading outlining the





In addition to the Eighth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit also denies admission
of prior inconsistent pleadings when the inconsistency resulted from settle-
ments by some defendants prior to trial.a The District of Columbia Circuit
excludes inconsistent pleadings made in third party proceedings because of the
allowable use of hypothesis in pleadings. 9
Other circuits, however, have allowed admission of inconsistent pleadings.
In Vincent v. Louis Marx & Co.,' the First Circuit held that admission of
inconsistent pleadings was left to the discretion of the trial court under FED. R.
EVID. 403,91 which requires a balancing test between the probative value of
the statement and the likely prejudicial effect it may have on the trier of
fact.92 Prior pleadings have been admitted as an impeachment tool under FED.
R. EVID. 61391 by the Sixth Circuit in situations where a person's testimony
materially differs from one lawsuit to the next.94
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has permitted the admission of prior inconsis-
tent pleadings. Admission of pleadings that were abandoned prior to trial was
allowed in Haynes v. Manning95 under the abandoned pleadings doctrine.
This doctrine was first discussed in Friedman v. Sealy, Inc.,96 in which prior
inconsistent pleadings were admitted because the opposing party had an oppor-
tunity to explain why the pleadings were abandoned. 97
87. See 4 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 425, at
306 (1980) which states FRCP 8 allows parties to plead hypothetically, inconsistently, and in the
alternative. Where any variance between a pleading and evidence presented by a party is explain-
able as an attempt to take advantage of this liberality, use of the pleading as a evidential admis-
sion should be disallowed. Id. Pleadings are directed at giving notice "and lack the essential char-
acter of an admission." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 265, at 781-82 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d
ed. 1984). "To allow them to operate as admissions would render their use ineffective and frus-
trate their underlying purpose." Id. at 781.
88. Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
doctrine of liberality in pleading, and flexible joinder rules, precluded the admission of inconsis-
tent pleadings made against defendants who had settled prior to trial).
89. See Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that the goals of efficient federal procedure would be frustrated if hypothetical pleadings from
third party proceedings were admitted into evidence), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 994 (1982).
90. 874 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. Id. at 38.
92. See supra note 9. This balancing test requirement was followed in a subsequent First
Circuit decision, Kassel v. Gannett Co., 875 F.2d 935, 952 (1st Cir. 1989) (indicating that not all
statements in a prior inconsistent statement need be admitted, just the ones that will not confuse
the venire or unduly protract the proceedings).
93. FED. R. EVID. 613 allows a party to question a witness regarding prior statements made
by the witness.
94. Williams v. Union Carbide Corp., 790 F.2d 552, 556 (6th Cir.) (admitting statements
made by the plaintiff's attorney during a previous lawsuit to impeach testimony in a subsequent
trial), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 992 (1986).
95. 917 F.2d 450, 454 (10th Cir. 1990). The plaintiff filed claims against several car dealers,
then settled with all but the defendants. Id. at 451-52. The court affirmed the lower court's ruling
that pleadings for the settled claims were abandoned. Id. at 454.
96. 274 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1959) (noting that because admissions were contained in
pleadings does not make them inadmissible, nor does it matter that the representation was made
against a third party).
97. See id. at 260-61.
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Prior pleadings were admitted in Glaesman v. Shop-Rite Foods, Inc.98
because the allegations from a prior complaint were considered evidentiary
admissions against interest.' The plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit
against a business operator who had previously filed suit against their landlord
alleging that dangerous conditions existed on the premises."s The court held
that the prior pleadings against the landlord were admissible in the current ac-
tion.
1 1
In Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc.,"°2 the Tenth Circuit reversed a deci-
sion that had precluded introduction of prior pleadings from an ancillary com-
plaint. The court held that the inconsistent pleadings were admissible because
the plaintiffs had argued at trial that the defendants were the sole cause of the
accident.' °3 The issue centered on who was at fault when a medical evacua-
tion helicopter crashed. The allegations of fault made prior to trial were in-
consistent with the position the plaintiff took at trial. The pleadings were ad-
missible as admissions against interest."
Dugan was recently followed in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Dyer. 5 An appellant, Colley, filed a wrongful death action against
Dyer in a Wyoming state court." Colley alleged that Dyer was a Wyoming
resident in that complaint.0 7 State Farm filed a declarative action in federal
court to establish that it did not have a duty to defend Dyer against, Colley in
the state action."' Colley filed a motion with the federal court objecting to
the declarative action on the grounds that State Farm lacked diversity with
Dyer." In his motion, Colley alleged that Dyer, like State Farm, might be
an Illinois resident."0 Relying on Dugan, the court admitted the inconsistent
state court complaint, which asserted Dyer was a Wyoming resident, to contra-
dict the assertion Dyer made in federal court."'
These recent Tenth Circuit cases seemingly emphasize only whether the
prior statements are inconsistent with present statements. There is little men-
tion in the opinions of the balancing test required by other circuits. There is
also no indication that the Tenth Circuit places much emphasis on the opportu-
98. 438 F.2d 341, 342 (10th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
99. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) provides that an admission by a party-opponent is not hearsay if
it is the party's own statement in either an individual or representative capacity.
100. Glaesman, 438 F.2d at 341-42.
101. Id. at 342.
102. 915 F.2d 1428 (10th Cir. 1990).
103. Id. at 1434. The prior allegations were considered factual, not hypothetical. Thus, the
Circuit was more easily inclined to admit those relevant facts in the subsequent trial. Id.
104. Id. The Tenth Circuit stated the district court erred by not conducting a rule 403 balanc-
ing test which would have resulted in admission of the prior complaint. Id. at 1434-35.
105. 19 F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994).
106. Id. at 516.
107. Id. at 519.
108. Id. at 516.
109. Id. at 516-17. Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction when the matter in controversy
exceeds $50,000 and is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1988). Colley
also alleged that Dyer was an indispensable party to the action, and that State Farm had waived a
defense of non-cooperation by Dyer. Dyer, 19 F.3d at 516.
110. Dyer, 19 F.3d at 517.
111. Id. at 519.
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nity to explain why prior pleadings were abandoned, or why different theories
of liability were introduced. Thus, the admissibility of prior inconsistent
pleadings containing a claim subsequently dropped prior to trial was the issue
in LWT, Inc. v. Childers.'
2
B. LWT, Inc. v. Childers
1. Facts
The plaintiff, LWT, purchased a hot oil heater from Childers." 3 LW1T
later sold the hot oil heater to RJR Mechanical. RJR sued LWT regarding the
heater's performance and maintenance record. The suit was brought in a South
Carolina state court."4 In answering RJR's complaint, LWT asserted the
manufacturer's limited warranty as a bar to RJR's recovery."' That defense
was dropped prior to the beginning of the state trial, for reasons not discussed
in the opinion."6
After the state court action, LWT commenced suit against Childers in the
New Mexico Federal District Court." 7 In that suit, LWT claimed that there
was no limited warranty,' and that Childers breached a warranty of mer-
chantability." 9 Childers lost on a summary judgment motion.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Childers prevailed on the question of
whether material facts were at issue regarding the warranty. 2 ' The Tenth
Circuit also addressed the issue of whether the state court allegations were ad-
missible in the subsequent federal action.' 2' The district court decision, re-
fusing admission of the state pleadings, was reviewed under an abuse of dis-
cretion standard. 22 The appellate court followed Dugan by stating that in-
consistent allegations contained in prior pleadings are admissible as evidence
in subsequent litigation. The state court allegations that asserted the limited
warranty were inconsistent with the federal court allegations that denied a lim-
ited warranty. Therefore, those state pleadings were admissible as substantive
evidence under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 123 Without determining why the
limited warranty defense was dropped prior to the state trial, the circuit court
concluded that the abandonment at the state level was irrelevant to the federal
112. 19 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. 1994).
113. Id. at 541.
114. Id. at 542.
115. Id. U.C.C. § 2-316 provides that warranties may be limited unless such restrictions are
unreasonable. U.C.C. § 2-316 (1991).
116. 19 F.3d at 542. LWT did not specifically plead that the warranty was a defense. Id.
117. See id. at 539, 541.
118. See id. at 541. LWT claimed that the limited warranty never became part of the agree-
ment. Id.
119. Id. U.C.C. § 2-314(1)-(2) provides: "unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied. Merchantable goods are fit for the ordinary purposes for
which they are used." U.C.C. § 2-314(1)-(2) (1991).
120. LWT, 19 F.3d at 542-43.
121. Id. at 542. The Circuit did so because the prior pleadings may play a key role in the trial
after remand. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. The Circuit stated that LWT's reliance on the limited warranty in the South Carolina
litigation was directly contrary to the position LWT took against Childers in the federal action. Id.
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decision admitting the pleading.'24
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision admitting prior inconsistent pleadings can be
criticized in two ways. First, such admissions are counter to federal procedural
rules. Using prior pleadings against parties punishes them for following the
federal rules. Second, the decision may encourage forum shopping' 25 in the
Tenth Circuit region because at least one state court denies admission of prior
inconsistent pleadings.
The Tenth Circuit's decision is inconsistent with modem pleading rules
that encourage parties to assert all possible theories of liability. This modem
policy allows discovery practice to determine the validity of any claims. Not
all theories, however, must be presented at trial. Presumably, some theories
may be discarded if, upon discovery, they are found to be invalid. The Tenth
Circuit punishes parties who follow pleading rules by using the pleadings they
filed before discovery against them.
In LWT, it is possible that LWT dropped the limited warranty defense in
the state action after learning more about the issue in discovery. The Tenth
Circuit did not address the question of why the defense was dropped. Nor did
the court indicate that on remand the district court should conduct a FED. R.
EvID. 403 balancing test to determine whether such admission would be over-
ly prejudicial. The Circuit merely concluded that because the prior allegations
were inconsistent, they were admissible.'26
This decision may also result in forum shopping within the geographical
area of the Tenth Circuit. At least one state in the Tenth Circuit region refuses
to admit prior inconsistent pleadings. 27 Plaintiffs who have a choice between
bringing actions in either federal or state courts may choose a state court in an
attempt to keep their prior inconsistent pleadings out of evidence.'28
The Supreme Court of Kansas, in Lytle v. Stearns, refused to admit incon-
sistent, abandoned pleadings. 29 The court reasoned that admitting such
pleadings would unfairly punish the party because clients are rarely in a posi-
tion to explain the legal theories and strategies chosen by their attorney in
various stages of the proceeding. 3 ' The court was not persuaded by the fact
124. Id.
125. "Forum shopping" is referred to in this Survey as the practice that occurs when a party
selects a jurisdiction in which to commence litigation based on anticipated favorable application of
procedural or substantive law. Eliminating forum shopping between federal and state courts was
one goal of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (establishing that there is no general
federal common law, and state law governs in disputes in which federal courts have diversity
jurisdiction).
126. LWT, 19 F.3d at 542.
127. Lytle v. Steams, 830 P.2d 1197 (Kan. 1992).
128. Some defendants may successfully remove state actions to federal courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441 (1988). Removal to federal court may permit the defendant to escape state proce-
dural rules. However, in diversity actions removal is allowed only when the defendants are
noncitizens of the state in which the action is brought. DAVID W. LOUISELL ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE STATE AND FEDERAL 526 (6th ed. 1989).




that the party could be cross-examined regarding the prior pleadings. 3' It
recognized that inconsistencies may result from the fact that not all liability
theories are known prior to trial.'32 A jury may not understand why the attor-
ney would pursue various legal theories. Thus, requiring the party to testify
regarding prior or abandoned pleadings would deny a party a fair trial' 3 a
In light of Lytle, parties with the choice of federal or state courts in the
Tenth Circuit region may select a forum based on whether prior inconsistent
pleadings are admissible. Arguably, the outcome of disputes that may be
brought in either state or federal court should not turn upon procedural matters
such as evidentiary admissions.'34
The LWT decision further demonstrates, as did the interstate transportation
of firearms issue, the Tenth Circuit's liberalized policy of admitting most
relevant evidence without providing cautionary measures against prejudice.
Opponents of these evidentiary admissions would not face such prejudice if
they were litigating in other jurisdictions. The Tenth Circuit's policy is counter
to federal procedural rules and could unfairly prejudice opponents to evidentia-
ry admissions.
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF VIDEO ANIMATION
A. Background
"Video animation adds a new and powerful evidentiary tool to the trial
scene."' 35 It is used primarily to demonstrate theories presented in documents
or testimony by expert witnesses.'36 The animation may be so "technically
unique and scientifically accurate" as to be admissible as substantive evi-
dence."37
Video animation may have dramatic power over the trier of fact. 3
131. Id. at 1205. The court assumed, arguendo, that the pleadings could be construed as ad-
missions against interest, but still found the cross-examination of plaintiff was inadequate because
clients cannot explain the legal theories chosen by their attorneys. Id.
132. See id. at 1208. The Lytle's initial complaint was brought against Steams and a few
other parties. Steams filed a comparative negligence motion naming several additional parties.
Lytle's amended complaint named these additional parties. Id. at 1201. Lytle was cross-examined
regarding why the initial complaint was abandoned. Id. at 1204. Each claim in the second com-
plaint was set out as a separate count against separate defendants. Id. at 1207.
133. Id. at 1208. The court stated that a lay witness, such as Mr. Lytle, should not be cross-
examined regarding theories asserted against a former party who is no longer in the lawsuit if that
party was brought into the litigation after being designated by the initial defendant for comparative
negligence purposes. Id.
134. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that
federal procedural rules affecting the outcome of decisions which our constitutional system leaves
to state regulations must yield to the state rule). See also Olin G. Wellborn III, The Federal Rules
of Evidence and the Application of State Law in the Federal Courts, 55 TEx. L. REv. 371, 374-75
(1977) (discussing whether Federal Rules of Evidence are procedural, rather than substantive, and
whether the federal rules supersede conflicting state law).
135. Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1088 (10th Cit. 1994).
136. Robert Simmons and J. Daniel Lounsbery, Admissibility of Computer-Animated
Reenactments in Federal Courts, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 78 (discussing the admissibility of video
animation and overcoming objections by establishing authenticity and relevance).
137. Id.
138. See J. Stratton Shartel, Computer Animation Often Provides Winning Edge for Litigators,
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Some courts have declined to admit video animation because of the possible
prejudicial impact.'39 Other courts admit computer generated evidence only
after a determination that the machine generating the information, and those
who supply its data, have "performed their functions with utmost accura-
cy.,,'
One of the first cases admitting such simulations was Perma Research &
Development v. Singer Co. 4' The plaintiff provided the defendant an exclu-
sive license to perfect an anti-skid device.42 The defendant abandoned the
project claiming that the device was not perfectible 43 and the plaintiff sued
for breach of contract.'" At trial, the plaintiff was allowed to introduce com-
puter simulations that indicated that the device was perfectible. 45 The
plaintiff won at the trial court level and the appellate court affirmed the
verdict.'" The Second Circuit found no reversible error regarding admission
of the computer simulation, because the defendant had ample opportunity to
cross-examine the expert presenting the simulation. 47
Video animation is not necessarily a new classification of evidence;" it
simply involves new technology. 49 Movies depicting recreations of accidents
were the precursors to videos of accident reenactments. The Tenth Circuit has
long recognized the importance of filmed reenactments to illustrate an expert's
theory of causation. In Brandt v. French,' a motorcycle accident case,
filmed reenactments created by an expert engineering firm were admitted to
show angles of "lean" and radii for turns of different positions for the purpose
of illustrating how the motorcycle turned in front of the defendant's car. 5'
The primary objection to the video was that hypothetical conclusions were
formed which were not based on facts brought out at trial. The Tenth Cir-
7 No. 5 INSIDE LITIG. 1, (1993) (discussing strategies for using computer animation).
139. Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (refusing to admit computer generated animation). "[S]eeing is believing,"
reasoned the court, and held that the animation was more prejudicial than probative and could not
be overcome by cross-examination. Id.
140. United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895 (9th Cit. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring). The
issue in this case centered on admissibility of computer generated business records. Id. at 891. See
also Strock v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co., No. 92-2357, 1993 WL 279069 (4th Cir.
July 12, 1993) (per curiam). The court, in an unpublished disposition, held that the decision to
admit computer animation should be left to the discretion of the trial judge and reversed only for
abuse of discretion. Id. at *1. The opponent of the video stipulated that he was given ample evi-
dence to cross examine the expert that prepared the animation. Id. at * I n.2.
141. 542 F.2d III (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
142. Id. at 113.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 115.
146. Id. at 113.
147. Id. at 115.
148. Simmons & Lounsberry, supra note 136, at 78.
149. See Daniel Tynan, Evidence in Motion, 13 CAL. LAW. 85 (1993) (discussing new techno-
logical advances in animation, the presentation of such at trial, and the conclusions that the mate-
rial presented is an old message brought through a new medium).
150. 638 F.2d 209 (10th Cir. 1981).
151. Id. at 211. "The content of the film was not meant to depict the actual event of the acci-
dent but rather to show mechanical principles relative to two vehicles ..... Id. at 212.
152. Id. at 212.
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cuit stated that demonstration of experiments, such as those shown on the film,
used merely to illustrate the principles in forming an expert opinion, do not
require strict adherence to the facts. Admission is proper if the experiments
were conducted under conditions similar to those of the accident, and as long
as the jury is instructed regarding the theoretical basis and the limited purpose
for which it is offered.
1 53
A recent 1993 United States Supreme Court case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,54 will likely make admission of video animation
more commonplace. That decision set aside the long standing Frye Rule,
which premised admissibility of scientific evidence on whether the scientific
community had generally accepted the theory offered by the expert testimo-
ny. "'55 General acceptance, however, is no longer necessary. "New" theories
are admissible if the trial judge ensures that the proposed testimony rests on
reliable data and foundation and is relevant to the action before the court.'56
The Daubert court based its decision on the federal rules of evidence,
primarily those rules pertaining to expert witnesses. The Court deferred to the
trial court in determining whether scientific evidence is admissible.57 pursu-
ant to FED. R. EvID. 104(a)' and 702.' The Court provided assistance to
trial judges to help make this preliminary assessment, but it essentially en-
trusted them with the capacity to determine admissibility."6
Since a video reenactment is likely to be based on expert testimony, the
admissibility of such evidence is made possible under the guidelines presented
in Daubert. The confidence and deference placed in the trial judge will likely
make the admission of video animation illustrating expert opinions easier to
obtain. Daubert played a key role in determining the admissibility of the ani-
mation at issue in Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad.6 '
153. Id. See also Gilbert v. Cosco Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting that exper-
iments should demonstrate a similarity of circumstances and conditions, but strict adherence to the
facts is not required if illustrating principles upon which the expert based his opinion). The court
noted that the jury should be advised of the limited purposes of the admission. Id.
154. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
155. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under the Frye Rule, expert
opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is generally accepted
as reliable in the relevant scientific community. Id. Frye recognized that it is difficult to deteimine
when a scientific principle crosses the line from experimental to demonstrable. One way to do so
is to rely on the theory's acceptance rate in the particular scientific field in which it belongs. Id.
156. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
157. Id. at 2796.
158. FED. R. EviD. 104(a) provides: "Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be de-
termined by the court ......
159. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
160. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796. Those considerations include: whether the theory can be
and has been tested; whether the theory has been subject to peer review and publication; as to a
particular scientific technique, the court should consider the known rate of error; and a less re-
strictive consideration of whether the theory has received some level of general acceptance. Id. at
2796-97.
161. 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1994).
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B. Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad
1. Facts
The Robinsons brought a wrongful death action against Missouri Pacific
Railroad (MOPAC) for damages resulting from a collision between a passen-
ger vehicle and a train. 62 At trial, the Robinsons claimed that the accident
occurred because the crossing gates at the intersection did not lower at the
proper time and that, despite the oncoming train, the driver was not warned
about the train. To support that theory, the Robinsons pointed to the wreckage,
indicating the car was pushed 2,000 feet down the track. They argued this was
evidence that the train struck the vehicle at a perpendicular angle.'63
MOPAC countered with the theory that the cause of the accident was the
vehicle driver's attempt to go around the lowered gates. MOPAC claimed the
train struck the car at a sharp angle. The Robinsons argued that if the train
had struck the vehicle at a sharp angle, the car would have been pushed off
the track, not pushed the length of the track. MOPAC countered that the loca-
tion of the vehicle after impact was not dispositive since the train and vehicle
were locked together by the impact, and thus, the vehicle could not have been
pushed off the track."6
In order to prove their theory, the Robinsons presented video animation
prepared by their expert to illustrate his testimony. 65 The jury awarded dam-
ages to the estates, but found the vehicle driver thirty per cent at fault. Both
parties appealed the verdict."6 MOPAC objected to the video admission on
appeal. 67
The Tenth Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard and affirmed the
trial judge's decision to admit the video animation."6 The court recognized
that the issue was close, but nonetheless rejected MOPAC's claim of error."6
Following Daubert, the court deferred to the trial judge's balancing test re-
garding the scientific evidence and the probative nature of the video anima-
tion. ° The Tenth Circuit reviewed the steps taken by the Robinsons prior to
162. Id. at 1084. Julia Ann Turnbull, the driver of the vehicle and her infant son were killed
in the collision. The Robinsons sued on behalf of the infant son's estate. Three other people, a
mother and her two children, were also killed in the collision; their personal representative settled
with MOPAC prior to trial. Id. at 1084-85.
163. Id. at 1085. A witness also testified to having a near-miss at the same crossing six days
earlier. Id.
164. Id. MOPAC presented witnesses who testified to seeing a car, presumably Julia
Turnbull's, drive around the gates and into the crossing. Id. at 1086.
165. Id. The expert created the video by first making a scale model of the accident scene. The
model included a train and car which could be moved along simulating the scene. The expert then
had a video camera record the scene every 1/10 of a second as he moved the train at a scale speed
of 49 m.p.h. and the car of 13 m.p.h. (these were the expert's estimated speeds of the vehicles).
The video first depicted the theory that the train struck the car at a perpendicular angle. The car,
in the video, was pushed the length of the track. The video then depicted the theory that the train
struck at a sharp angle. The car, in the video, was pushed off the track. Id.
166. Id. at 1085.
167. Id. at 1086.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1088. The Tenth Circuit specifically recognized that under FED. R. EVl). 403, the
judge may admit the relevant evidence if the probative value substantially outweighs the danger of
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and during trial regarding admissibility. A pre-trial conference was held re-
garding the video. 7' During trial, before the jury viewed the video, the ex-
pert testified regarding how the video was prepared. The judge instructed the
jury that the video was not a recreation of the accident, but was created only
to illustrate certain principles.'
The Tenth Circuit held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
given the solely illustrative purpose of the video, the limiting instruction given
the jury, and the opportunity for cross-examination.' The court, however,
recognized that the video may have created undue prejudice. The court rea-
soned that the prejudice did not survive the entire trial, as evidenced by the
fact the jury determined the driver was partially at fault.'
In discussing how Daubert controlled this case, and will control future
cases, the Tenth Circuit categorized video animation as scientific evidence
presenting the principles of physics.'75 Accordingly, FED. R. EVID. 702 ap-
plied and the district court should act as the "gatekeeper" to "meticulously
make an early pretrial evaluation" of the proffered animation.'76 Admission
of animation requires evaluation under the flexible standard of Rule 702, but
the animation must have evidentiary relevance and reliability.1
77
2. Analysis
Robinson is the first published circuit opinion regarding admissibility of
video animation to illustrate an expert's accident causation theory. With the
increasing use of technology in courtrooms,' 78 future challenges in the Tenth
Circuit may soon involve admissibility issues regarding computer generated
animation. 79 The increasing use of technology may add new opportunities
unfair prejudice. Id.
171. Id. at 1086 n.2. MOPAC conceded in the pre-trial conference that admission of the video
was within the trial judge's discretion. See id.
172. Id. at 1086. The specific instructions stated: "The only reason this is shown is that the
witness will testify about certain principles that he feels that this video would show to the jury
and perhaps it would be helpful to you. So just bear in mind that you cannot recreate an acci-
dent." Id.
173. Id. at 1088.
174. Id. The driver was 30% at fault. Id. at 1085.
175. Id. at 1088. The Tenth Circuit admitted that an argument could be made that "it is out-
side scientific knowledge to opine in a crash such as this" that a car struck at an angle will "nec-
essarily leave the railroad tracks on impact." Id. at 1089.
176. Id. at 1089. Regarding pretrial disclosure, effective December 1, 1993, the Federal dis-
covery rules were amended so that all parties and the court should possess full information well in
advance of trial regarding proposed expert testimony. Each expert witness is required to prepare a
report containing a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and any exhibits, such as
video animation, to be presented at trial. Id. at 1089 n.6. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (requir-
ing initial disclosure of non-privileged information regarding expert testimony); FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(3) (encouraging advance rulings from the court regarding evidentiary admissions).
177. Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1088. The same flexibility should inform the trial court's consider-
ation of objections to the animation. Those objections may include FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (authenti-
cation); FED. R. EVID. 801 (hearsay); FED. R. EVID. 403 (undue prejudice as an attempted reenact-
ment). Id. at 1089 n.7.
178. See Mark Curriden, Courtroom of the Future is Here, 81 A.B.A. J. 22 (1995) (discussing
new technology available for courtroom use).
179. See Simmons & Lounsbery, supra note 136 for a discussion of anticipated steps to ad-
missibility of computer animated reenactments in federal courts.
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for creative experts to use computers to their favor. Under Robinson, trial
courts are granted deference to decide expert opinion admissibility issues,
requiring them to keep abreast of technology. While this is clearly the mandate
of Daubert, the possibility of undue prejudice may increase. Judges, like lay
people, may be swayed by computer simulations that seemingly portray what
occurred in fact. It may be difficult to discern that the simulation is only the
expert's opinion. The transition from admitting videos showing actual motor-
cycles to video animation, created either by expert staging or by computer,
indicates the confidence the circuit places in both the trial court and the jury.
That confidence requires triers of fact to understand that animation presents
only a theory, not a reenactment. The possibility of unfounded persuasion is
manifest. Other courts do not have such confidence in their juries.8 0
Robinson is a clear example of the Tenth Circuit's willingness to admit
new and controversial evidence to assist the trier of fact. The Tenth Circuit's
policy regarding video animation furthers the Supreme Court's interpretation
of expert opinion testimony. Opponents to these evidentiary admissions, how-
ever, argue that the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.
CONCLUSION
Analysis of these three survey-year opinions reveal the Tenth Circuit's
trend affirming rulings which allow evidentiary admissions. According to the
Tenth Circuit, admission of controversial evidence is left to the discretion of
the trial court. In all three of the cases addressed, the Tenth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's admission.
Presumably, in any given case, one party may object to this liberalized
policy of admitting probative evidence that appears too prejudicial. However,
the Tenth Circuit's policy generally complies with legislative goals to punish
armed and/or repeat offenders. The lowered requisite foundation for evidence
to prove gun possession fosters the achievement of those goals. Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit's approach regarding admissibility of expert testimony fol-
lows Supreme Court decisions. Visually enhanced demonstrative evidence is
admissible to help explain expert testimony. The Tenth Circuit's approach
regarding admissibility of inconsistent pleadings, however, is contrary to the
federal pleading rules and may unduly prejudice parties litigating in multiple
courts or against multiple parties.
The Tenth Circuit embraces new technology and controversial methods of
proof. This policy allows the trier of fact to consider all relevant evidence to
separate the probative from the prejudicial in order to determine the ultimate
issue. Based on these Survey cases, future appeals to the Tenth Circuit regard-
ing district court admissions of disputed evidence are unlikely to succeed.
Richard C. Jennings
180. See supra note 139.
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